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Abstract
We introduce a Bayesian solution for the problem in forensic
speaker recognition, where there may be very little background
material for estimating score calibration parameters. We work
within the Bayesian paradigm of evidence reporting and de-
velop a principled probabilistic treatment of the problem, which
results in a Bayesian likelihood-ratio as the vehicle for report-
ing weight of evidence. We show in contrast, that reporting a
likelihood-ratio distribution does not solve this problem. Our
solution is experimentally exercised on a simulated forensic
scenario, using NIST SRE’12 scores, which demonstrates a
clear advantage for the proposed method compared to the tra-
ditional plugin calibration recipe.
Index Terms: forensic speaker recognition, Bayesian paradigm
1. Introduction
The problem that we address is how to use the output (score)
of a speaker recognizer to make minimum-expected-cost Bayes
decisions. Bayes decision theory provides an idealized math-
ematical model for the legal process in a court case, where it
has to be established whether the prosecution hypothesis holds
beyond a reasonable doubt. One interpretation of this model
is that it quantifies doubt via posterior probabilities, while the
reasonable threshold can be expressed via the relative costs of
false acquittal and false conviction. Specifically, this model pre-
scribes, convict if
P (prosecution hypothesis|evidence)
P (defence hypothesis|evidence) >
Cfalse-convict
Cfalse-acquit
(1)
The LHS represents the doubt, while the RHS is the reasonable
threshold. Another interpretation is that it chooses the course of
action (convict or acquit) which minimizes the expected cost of
making a wrong decision.
The threshold could instead be motivated without explicit
reference to cost. Jaynes [1] suggests: Setting the threshold at
10 000 “will mean, crudely, that on the average not more than
one conviction in 10 000 will be in error; a judge who required
juries to follow this rule would probably not make one false
conviction in a working lifetime on the bench”.
The purpose of this paper is not to debate the applicability
of speaker recognition or Bayes decision theory to real court
cases—for examples of such debate, see [2, 3]. Our goal is to
design speaker recognizers to produce outputs with a clearly de-
fined interpretation. This interpretation is supplied by the Bayes
decision model. We work within this model and try to make our
recognizer as good as possible according to this interpretation.
2. Theory
We shall restrict ourselves to the scientific problem of comput-
ing the LHS of (1), with the assumption that the legal process
will take care of quantifying the RHS. We follow Balding’s
principle [4]: “Evidence is of value inasmuch as it alters the
probability that the defendant is guilty”.
In the Bayesian paradigm for forensic evidence reporting, it
is recommended that the posterior odds, i.e. the LHS of (1), be
factored as posterior odds = prior odds×likelihood-ratio [5, 6].
The prior odds is then moved to the RHS, where it is lumped to-
gether with the threshold as part of the legal process, reducing
the scientific problem to just dealing with the likelihood-ratio.
In this paper we shall eventually do so—our final results will be
given in terms of likelihood-ratios. But we strongly recommend
that when analysing how to compute such likelihood-ratios, one
does not directly jump to working with likelihood-ratios—a
habit that could easily lead to incorrect application of probabil-
ity theory—see [7] and further discussion below. The safe route
to deriving this kind of calculation is to first express the desired
posterior and then (if possible) to factor out the likelihood-ratio.
In general, a single likelihood-ratio representing the evidence
cannot always be factored out—see [4, 7] for examples.
2.1. Hypothesis posteriors
In what follows we shall make use of the notation of directed
graphical models (Bayesian networks) [8] to specify condi-
tional independence relationships. Readers are urged to famil-
iarize themselves with this notation and how to read indepen-
dence relationships from such graphs.1
We consider a trial that has to determine whether a defen-
dant is the perpetrator of a crime. The prosecution hypothesis,
denoted H1, states that the defendant and the perpetrator are
the same, while the defence hypothesis, H2, states that they are
different. The evidence can be separated into two parts: speech
evidence, denoted e, and other evidence, denoted pi. We as-
sume2 that the following can be computed (or is given):
pii = P (Hi|pi),where pi1 + pi2 = 1 (2)
In this context we can refer to pi as the hypothesis prior and we
are not concerned about how (2) is computed.
What does concern us, is computation involving the speech
evidence. In general, the speech evidence has two parts: speech
samples known to be of the defendant and speech samples
known to be of the perpetrator of the crime. In this work how-
ever, we shall eventually limit our scope to processed speech
evidence in the form of automatic speaker recognizer scores.
1Observation at a node with convergent arrows (or observation at
any of its descendants) induces dependency between variables linked
via this node; when not observed, such nodes block dependency. Con-
versely, nodes with divergent or aligned arrows induce dependency
when not observed; and block dependency when observed. A node is
‘observed’ if it appears to the right of the | in probability notation.
2This assumption is part of the idealized mathematical model, and
is not meant to describe what happens in actual legal practice.
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We shall analyse our speech evidence, e, with the help of a
generative model of the form P (e|h, θ), where h ∈ {H1, H2}
and where θ denotes the parameters of the generative model. In
graphical notation, the variables we have identified so far are
related as:
θ → e← h← pi (3)
If θ is given, the calculation of the posterior odds is well known:
P (H1|e,pi, θ)
P (H2|e,pi, θ) =
P (H1|pi)
P (H2|pi) ×
P (e|θ,H1)
P (e|θ,H2) (4)
where the RHS is the product of prior odds and likelihood-ratio
(LR). In real life however, θ is not given. If we have a suitable,
large, supervised database of speech data available, θ can be
estimated and plugged into (4) and we are done. We shall refer
to this version of the likelihood-ratio as the plugin LR:
Rplug(e|θ) = P (e|θ,H1)
P (e|θ,H2) (5)
It is often however the case in forensic scenarios that the large
supervised databases that are available (for example LDC data)
could be deemed too different from the speech encountered in
the forensic case at hand. Then we may have to resort to using
a small forensic database for estimating θ. Naturally, questions
arise: What is the minimum size of database that I can use?
What is the effect of the database size on the end-result of my
calculation?
Answers are provided by enlarging the scope of our prob-
abilistic treatment to a so-called fully Bayesian treatment. In-
stead of regarding θ as given, we admit it is not given and in-
stead assume a much weaker constraint, namely some suitable
prior distribution, P (θ|Π), parametrized by the hyperparame-
ters Π. We denote the (small) supervised database (or back-
ground data) by D = (E,L), where E represents a collection
of (processed) speech samples and L represents the associated
labels. The graphical notation for this more complete specifica-
tion reads:
L→ E ← θ → e← h← pi, (6)
with Π → θ omitted for brevity. This diagram makes explicit
the assumption that the background data, E, and the evidence,
e, were generated by the very same model parameters. Taking
into account the independence assumptions encoded by (6), the
posterior odds can be expressed as:
P (H1|e,D,pi,Π)
P (H2|e,D,pi,Π) =
P (H1|pi)
P (H2|pi) ×
P (e|D,Π, H1)
P (e|D,Π, H2) (7)
This Bayesian posterior odds also factors into prior odds and a
Bayesian LR, which we denote:
RB(e|D) = P (e|D,Π, H1)
P (e|D,Π, H2) (8)
2.2. The Bayesian likelihood-ratio
To compute the LR (8), we can express the numerator or de-
nominator as:
P (e|D,Π, Hi) =
∫
Θ
P (e, θ|D,Π, Hi) dθ
=
∫
Θ
P (e|θ,D,Π, Hi)P (θ|D,Π, Hi) dθ
=
∫
Θ
P (e|θ,Hi)P (θ|D,Π) dθ
(9)
where Θ represents the support of P (θ|Π) and where we have
dropped irrelevant conditioning terms using the independence
relationships encoded by (6). We shall refer to P (e|θ,Hi) as
the plugin likelihood and to P (θ|D,Π) as the parameter poste-
rior. The parameter posterior represents everything we know
about the parameters after having processed the background
data D. The required LR now becomes:
RB(e|D) =
∫
Θ
P (e|θ,H1)P (θ|D,Π) dθ∫
Θ
P (e|θ,H2)P (θ|D,Π) dθ
=
〈
P (e|θ,H1)
〉
P (θ|D,Π)〈
P (e|θ,H2)
〉
P (θ|D,Π)
(10)
which is a ratio of expected likelihoods, with expectations taken
w.r.t. the parameter posterior.
If however, one immediately starts with the agenda of let’s
calculate the likelihood-ratio, without referring to a careful
specification as in (6), it is easier to fall into the trap of doing
erroneous calculations like taking expectations of the plugin LR
or its logarithm:〈P (e|θ,H1)
P (e|θ,H2)
〉
θ
or
〈
log
P (e|θ,H1)
P (e|θ,H2)
〉
θ
In fact, following our derivation in [9], we can make the dif-
ference between the expected plugin log-LR and the correct
Bayesian LR explicit:
logRB(e|D) =
〈
logRplug(e|θ)
〉
θ
+
〈
log
P (θ|D, e,H2,Π)
P (θ|D, e,H1,Π)
〉
θ
(11)
where P (θ|D, e,Hi,Π) is an augmented parameter posterior
conditioned onD as well as one additional supervised example,
e, with assumed label Hi. This relationship holds for expecta-
tions over any distribution for θ that avoids zero denominators.
Consider the following scenario. A forensic practitioner is
tasked with summarizing the weight of the speech evidence, e,
for use in court. He decides to provide this via Rplug(e|D).
He realizes however, that his D is small and that if he had
happened to have had some other small database, say D′,
the value Rplug(e|D′) could have been substantially different.
He therefore goes and simulates the selection of many simi-
larly sized databases and for each such simulation computes
logRplug(e|D′), keeping e constant, but varying D′. Armed
with a collection of such values, he can now summarize his
findings as log(LR) = µ ± σ, where µ and σ are the mean
and standard deviation of the collection of simulated values.
What is the court to do with µ and σ? How does this help
the court to decide between H1 and H2? The court could per-
haps decide, if σ is too large, that the evidence cannot be trusted
and that the decision should be based solely on P (H1|pi)
P (H2|pi) . Or, the
court could decide, if σ is small enough, to go ahead and use µ
to represent the weight of evidence. But µ =
〈
logRplug(e|θ)
〉
θ
where the distribution for this expectation is formed by the
above sampling process. Our (11) shows that µ cannot give the
correct value (except perhaps by accident), because the second
term is ignored.
More generally, any procedure that attempts to represent the
evidence via a probability distribution over the plugin LR (e.g.
[10]) fails to enable the court to compute the posterior proba-
bilities required by (1). Submitting LR distributions to court
is therefore contrary to Balding’s principle that “evidence is of
value inasmuch as it alters the probability that the defendant is
guilty”.
If we want to work within the constraints of Bayes decision
theory, probability theory should be followed to compute the
posteriors. In the case of the simple model in (6), the solution
is given by (10).
2.3. Integrating out θ
Computing RB via (10) requires the computation of integrals
w.r.t. θ. For a restricted class of conjugate-exponential models
this can be done in closed form (we show an example later),
but in general, closed-form solutions are not available [8]. This
means the integrals have to be approximated. This section pro-
vides some general advice to help to avoid gross inaccuracy
with such approximation.
The first apparent problem is that the parameter posterior,
P (θ|D,Π), which is required for (10), conceals a similar inte-
gral. Recalling D = (E,L) and using (6), we have:
P (θ|D,Π) = P (θ|E,L,Π) = P (θ|Π)P (E|L, θ)
P (E|L,Π) (12)
where the normalizer is:
P (E|L,Π) =
∫
Θ
P (θ|Π)P (E|L, θ) dθ (13)
But, since this normalizer is independent of h and θ, it cancels
in (10), giving:
RB(e|D) =
∫
Θ
P (e|θ,H1)P (E|θ, L)P (θ|Π) dθ∫
Θ
P (e|θ,H2)P (E|θ, L)P (θ|Π) dθ
=
∫
Θ
P (e, E|θ,H1, L)P (θ|Π) dθ∫
Θ
P (e, E|θ,H2, L)P (θ|Π) dθ
=
P (e, E|H1, L,Π)
P (e, E|H2, L,Π)
(14)
where the new numerator and denominator are just the normal-
izers of our previously introduced augmented parameter poste-
riors, P (θ|D, e,Hi,Π).
We see now that the real challenge with the calculation of
RB is not the normalizer for P (θ|D,Π), but rather calculation
of two separate normalizers for each P (θ|D, e,Hi,Π).
A common practice for approximation in Bayesian calcu-
lations is to obtain an approximate parameter posterior, say
P˜ (θ|D,Π), on which further calculations are based. In our case
that would give:
RB(e|D) ≈
∫
Θ
P (e|θ,H1)P˜ (θ|D,Π) dθ∫
Θ
P (e|θ,H2)P˜ (θ|D,Π) dθ
(15)
Usually P˜ (θ|D,Π) is chosen to be a good approximation of
the true posterior near its peak, while the tails receive little at-
tention. Unfortunately, one or both of P (e|θ,Hi), as a func-
tion of θ, could have its peak far from the accurate region of
P˜ and could therefore effectively be sampling the approximate
posterior in inaccurate regions. In this situation, using indepen-
dent approximations for the numerator and denominator of (14)
could be more accurate.
However, (14) is not without its own pitfalls. In a situ-
ation where E contains very many examples, we could have
P (E|θ, L)  P (e|θ,Hi) and then finite numerical precision
could cause the numerator and denominator representations to
become identical. Care should be taken to decide which approx-
imation is best under the circumstances.
3. Bayesian calibration
Unfortunately, current generative models for speaker recogni-
tion, such as PLDA [11], are too complex [12] and perhaps at
the same time still too inaccurate, to allow direct Bayesian cal-
culation of the kind required here. That is, if we represent de-
fendant and perpetrator speech samples as i-vectors [13], so that
e is a pair of i-vectors, and use PLDA as the generative model,
then an accurate calculation ofRB is intractable. In fact, PLDA
does not even give accurate plugin likelihood-ratios. To obtain
well-calibrated likelihood-ratios from a speaker recognizer, an
intermediate step, known as calibration [14, 15] is required—
for recent examples see [16, 17, 18, 9, 19, 20].
For our current purposes, calibration can be understood as
follows. We process the original speech evidence via an au-
tomatic speaker recognizer which processes the defendant and
perpetrator speech samples to output a real score. A high (more
positive) score favours H1, while a low (more negative) score
favours H2. This score is now considered to be the evidence, e
for the trial at hand. Our supervised database, D = (E,L),
has E = s1, . . . , sn, a collection of n scores generated by
the same recognizer in response to n pairs of speech sam-
ples deemed similar the ones in the trial at hand. The labels,
L = `1, . . . , `n ∈ {H1, H2}, indicate whether each score was
computed from samples satisfying H1 or H2. In summary, e, h
refer to the score and hypothesis of the trial at hand, while the
st, `t refer to scores and hypotheses of the background data.
3.1. Normal score model, with conjugate prior
Bayesian calibration presents challenges in addition to the
above-mentioned integration problem.
The problem in the plugin method, of choosing a family of
score distributions [19], is shared by the Bayesian method. For
this paper we default to Gaussian score modelling, which will
suffice to demonstrate the advantages of Bayesian calibration.
Future work will examine more sophisticated score models.
The challenge of assigning the prior, P (θ|Π), should not
be underestimated. According to Jaynes [1], priors represent
the unfinished half of probability theory. For some thoughts on
selecting priors for forensic problems, see [21]. Here we aim for
simplicity and select a conjugate prior, which gives closed-form
integrals.
We let our model parameters be θ = (µ1, µ2, λ1, λ2), for a
Gaussian model of the form:
P (e|Hi, θ) = N (e|µi, λ−1i ) (16)
where the µi are means and the λi, are precisions (inverse vari-
ances). We consider the background data to be generated iid
from θ, so that:
P (E|L, θ) =
2∏
i=1
∏
t:`t=Hi
N (st|µi, λ−1i ) (17)
The conjugate prior is Gaussian-gammma, of the form [8]:
P (θ|µ0, β, a, b) =
2∏
i=1
N (µi|µ0, β−1λ−1)G(λi|a, b) (18)
where G is a gamma distribution with parameters a, b > 0. By
choosing a = b  1, λi has an expected value of 1 and a
very large variance, making this prior non-informative about the
scale of the scores. Likewise, to be non-informative about the
score location, we can arbitrarily choose µ0 = 0 and β  1,
which gives very large variance for µi.
Finally, RB(e|D) is computed by solving (9) in closed
form, which results in a T distribution—for details, see [22, 23,
8].
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Figure 1: Bayesian vs Plugin calibration, trained on 9 H1 and
27 H2 examples.
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Figure 2: Bayesian vs Plugin calibration, trained on 30 H1 and
405 H2 examples.
4. Experiments
Our experimental setup is similar to that in [9, 19], using
scores from a single speaker recognizer (an i-vector PLDA sys-
tem), which was part of the ABC submission [24] to the NIST
SRE’12 speaker recognition evaluation [25]. We selected back-
ground scores, D, from the ABC development database, con-
taining pre-SRE’12 speech, while the scores for the evidence in
the trial at hand, e, came from SRE’12.
We constructed D using either 3 or 10 speakers, with 3
recordings per speaker. For 3 speakers, this gave 9 H1 scores
and 27H2 scores, while for the 10 speaker case this gave 30H1
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Figure 3: Plugin calibration becomes overconfident with insuf-
ficient data. Bayesian calibration moderates its confidence as a
function of the data size.
and 405 H2 scores. The error-rates were averaged in each case
over 1000 different random selections of speakers for D.
To test how well it works, we vary the hypothesis prior pi1
over a wide range of values and plot the error-rate that results
when using our calibrated likelihood-ratios to make decisions
using (1). In a real court case the relative costs matter, but for
our purposes of evaluating accuracy, we can conveniently set
the costs to 1 without loss of generality [15, 26]. This error-rate
can be interpreted as the probability for a miscarriage of justice
(false acquit, or false convict).
The results are shown for D having 3 speakers (figure 1)
and for 10 speakers (figure 2), where we compare: (i) tradi-
tional plugin calibration; (ii) the proposed Bayesian calibration;
and (iii) simply convicting if pi1 > pi2, giving an error-rate of
min(pi1, pi2). The horizontal axis is log pi11−pi1 = log
pi1
pi2
.
Figure 3 compares the average hypothesis-conditional log-
LR values for plugin vs Bayesian, as a function of the amount of
background data. The Bayesian method behaves intuitively—
and the plugin method counterintuitively.
4.1. Discussion
Both plugin and Bayesian calibrations face two main challenges
on this data. The Bayesian method solves the first challenge:
(i) Limited training data. When the data is very limited (3
speakers) the Bayesian method clearly does better. With more
data (10 speakers) the problem is less severe and the gap closes.
(ii) This data exhibits mild dataset shift [27], where the
score distributions change between background and test sets.
Neither method has a mechanism for dealing with dataset shift.
Future work should examine ways of including dataset shift
modelling into the Bayesian method.
5. Conclusion
We have shown that by widening the scope of our probabilistic
treatment, the applicability of score calibration can be enlarged
to include challenging situations with very limited background
data. With limited data, the traditional plugin method misbe-
haves by being overconfident, while the Bayesian method mod-
erates its confidence as a function of the amount of data.
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